> it's still possible to believe chatgpt is unconscious for the same reason a game of tetris is unconscious.
Certainly. I just didn't know where you stood on the question.
In Nagel's terms, there is not something it is like to be a game of Tetris. A game of Tetris doesn't have experiences. "Something it is like" is an attempt to characterize the aspect of consciousness that's proved most difficult to explain - what Chalmers dubbed the hard problem.
How would you describe the distinction?
> fwiw I do think consciousness has some illusory aspects - which is only saying so much as "consciousness is different than it appears"
Certainly. I just didn't know where you stood on the question.
In Nagel's terms, there is not something it is like to be a game of Tetris. A game of Tetris doesn't have experiences. "Something it is like" is an attempt to characterize the aspect of consciousness that's proved most difficult to explain - what Chalmers dubbed the hard problem.
How would you describe the distinction?
> fwiw I do think consciousness has some illusory aspects - which is only saying so much as "consciousness is different than it appears"
Oh sure, I think that's widely accepted.