> No trust required.
You also have to trust that SGX isn't compromised.
But even without that, you can log what goes into SGX and what comes out of SGX. That seems pretty important, given that the packets flowing in and out need to be internet-routable and necessarily have IP headers. Their ISP could log the traffic, even if they don't.
> Packet Buffering and Timing Protection: A 10ms flush interval batches packets together for temporal obfuscation
That's something, I guess. I don't think 10ms worth of timing obfuscation gets you very much though.
> This temporal obfuscation prevents timing correlation attacks
This is a false statement. It makes correlation harder but correlation is a statistical relationship. The correlations are still there.
(latter quotes are from their github readme https://github.com/vpdotnet/vpnetd-sgx )
All that said, it is better to use SGX than to not use SGX, and it is better to use timing obfuscation than to not. Just don't let the marketing hype get ahead of the security properties!
You also have to trust that SGX isn't compromised.
But even without that, you can log what goes into SGX and what comes out of SGX. That seems pretty important, given that the packets flowing in and out need to be internet-routable and necessarily have IP headers. Their ISP could log the traffic, even if they don't.
> Packet Buffering and Timing Protection: A 10ms flush interval batches packets together for temporal obfuscation
That's something, I guess. I don't think 10ms worth of timing obfuscation gets you very much though.
> This temporal obfuscation prevents timing correlation attacks
This is a false statement. It makes correlation harder but correlation is a statistical relationship. The correlations are still there.
(latter quotes are from their github readme https://github.com/vpdotnet/vpnetd-sgx )
All that said, it is better to use SGX than to not use SGX, and it is better to use timing obfuscation than to not. Just don't let the marketing hype get ahead of the security properties!