I don't believe these solutions protect against flow correlation observations. If a global adversary is monitoring the entry and exit points, they can identify the user without needing to decrypt the traffic. There are research papers that demonstrate attacks on both these models.
Onion endpoint sites use encrypted traffic and the padding strategy, too and are still susceptible to the correlation attack.
There's a security blog that publishes research papers on different attack models. It's a total PITA to find but I'll see if I can locate it.
Onion endpoint sites use encrypted traffic and the padding strategy, too and are still susceptible to the correlation attack.
There's a security blog that publishes research papers on different attack models. It's a total PITA to find but I'll see if I can locate it.
edit: JFC... finally found it: https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/
Correlation attack concept: https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2024-337-p...
Attack against Mixnet and Nym: https://petsymposium.org/popets/2024/popets-2024-0050.pdf