Yes, that’s correct. All of these measures, of course, stand as a courtesy and are trivial to bypass, as ema notes.
Finding cryptographic-strength measures to identify LLM-generated content is a few orders of magnitude harder than optimistically marking them. Besides, it also relies on the content producer adding those indicators so that can’t be ignored as a major source of missing metadata.
But sometimes lossy mechanisms are still helpful because people who aren’t out with malicious purposes might copy and paste without being aware that the content is generated, while an auditor (be it anyone who inspects one level deeper) can discover in some (most?) cases the source of the content.
Finding cryptographic-strength measures to identify LLM-generated content is a few orders of magnitude harder than optimistically marking them. Besides, it also relies on the content producer adding those indicators so that can’t be ignored as a major source of missing metadata.
But sometimes lossy mechanisms are still helpful because people who aren’t out with malicious purposes might copy and paste without being aware that the content is generated, while an auditor (be it anyone who inspects one level deeper) can discover in some (most?) cases the source of the content.