You are correct. The probability of a state collision is cryptographically negligible, on the order of breaking a 256-bit hash function.
You're also right that AES-GCM is faster and has hardware support. Ariadne explores a different trade-off. Its primary advantage is its architectural agility.
Instead of a fixed algorithm, the sequence of operations in Ariadne is dynamic and secret, derived from the key and data history. An attacker doesn't just need to break a key; they have to contend with an unknown, ephemeral algorithm.
This same flexible structure allows the core CVM to be reconfigured into other primitives. We've built concepts for programmable proofs-of-work, verifiable delay functions, and even ring signatures.
You're also right that AES-GCM is faster and has hardware support. Ariadne explores a different trade-off. Its primary advantage is its architectural agility.
Instead of a fixed algorithm, the sequence of operations in Ariadne is dynamic and secret, derived from the key and data history. An attacker doesn't just need to break a key; they have to contend with an unknown, ephemeral algorithm.
This same flexible structure allows the core CVM to be reconfigured into other primitives. We've built concepts for programmable proofs-of-work, verifiable delay functions, and even ring signatures.