Software security has been running off large-scale automation for over a decade. LLMs might or might not be a step change in that automation (I'm optimistic but uncertain), but, unlike in conventional software development, the standard arguments about craft and thoughtfulness aren't operative here. If there was an argument to be had, it would have been had around the time Google stood up the mega fuzzing farms.
A fun thing to keep in mind about software security is that it's premised on the existence of a determined and amoral adversary. In the long-long ago, Richard Stallman's host at MIT had no password; anybody could log into it. It was a statement about the ethics of locking down computing resources. That's approximately the position any security practitioner would be taking if they attempted to moralize against LLM-assisted offensive computing.
A fun thing to keep in mind about software security is that it's premised on the existence of a determined and amoral adversary. In the long-long ago, Richard Stallman's host at MIT had no password; anybody could log into it. It was a statement about the ethics of locking down computing resources. That's approximately the position any security practitioner would be taking if they attempted to moralize against LLM-assisted offensive computing.