> An attack doesn’t have to be surprising to be an attack.
If you open an API to everyone, or put a password as plain text and index it, it's no surprise that someone accesses the "sensitive" data. Nor do I consider that an attack.
You simply can't feed the LLM the data, or grant it access to the data, then try to mitigate the risk by setting "guardrails" on the LLM itself. There WILL ALWAYS be a prompt to extract any data LLM has access to.
> Yes. That is exactly what the article recommends as a mitigation.
That's common sense, not mitigation. Expecting "security experts" to recommend that is like expecting a recommendation to always hash the password before storing it in the DB. Common sense. Obvious.
If you open an API to everyone, or put a password as plain text and index it, it's no surprise that someone accesses the "sensitive" data. Nor do I consider that an attack.
You simply can't feed the LLM the data, or grant it access to the data, then try to mitigate the risk by setting "guardrails" on the LLM itself. There WILL ALWAYS be a prompt to extract any data LLM has access to.
> Yes. That is exactly what the article recommends as a mitigation.
That's common sense, not mitigation. Expecting "security experts" to recommend that is like expecting a recommendation to always hash the password before storing it in the DB. Common sense. Obvious.