> War started in 2021, we are now in 2025, that's 4 years, estimated size of Russian army is ~1 500 000, which means they should have a minus 100 000 soldiers, that does not add up.
The war started in February 2022, not 2021. I do not recall saying that Russia has seen 400 000+ casualties for each of the three years. Quite the opposite: in the initial weeks of the invasion Russia made large gains with relatively tiny losses, estimated at low thousand a month. That progress has stalled and casualty rate has now grown tenfold to 48 670 dead and wounded for December 2024 (worst month of the entire invasion). January 2025 is narrowly behind with 48 240. The running total is estimated 850k+. The first year contributed 85k. The second year 300k. The third year 400k. Even if the pace of losses stops growing and remains where it currently is, Russia will lose another 12x48=576k this year.
How is this not a disaster? I'd appreciate if you answered with a coherent paragraph instead of sniping every single sentence with a oneliner.
The war started in February 2022, not 2021. I do not recall saying that Russia has seen 400 000+ casualties for each of the three years. Quite the opposite: in the initial weeks of the invasion Russia made large gains with relatively tiny losses, estimated at low thousand a month. That progress has stalled and casualty rate has now grown tenfold to 48 670 dead and wounded for December 2024 (worst month of the entire invasion). January 2025 is narrowly behind with 48 240. The running total is estimated 850k+. The first year contributed 85k. The second year 300k. The third year 400k. Even if the pace of losses stops growing and remains where it currently is, Russia will lose another 12x48=576k this year.
How is this not a disaster? I'd appreciate if you answered with a coherent paragraph instead of sniping every single sentence with a oneliner.