> Briar runs P2P over Tor so they can't collect data, even if they should want to.
That makes the common, dangerous, naive assumption that the implementation is secure. Correct, complete, secure implementations are very hard.
(It also assumes the design is secure, which is impossible to tell based on that limited information. P2P is not any more secure than over the Internet: In fact, it's easier to identify (there are only a few Briar P2P signals and near-infinite Internet signals - you've outed yourself), and if you mean local mesh P2P networking, that doesn't help at a protest, where the authorities also are present.)
In the more public app world, only Signal has done it well enough that experts trust it, and they have lots of free help from the expert security community.
That makes the common, dangerous, naive assumption that the implementation is secure. Correct, complete, secure implementations are very hard.
(It also assumes the design is secure, which is impossible to tell based on that limited information. P2P is not any more secure than over the Internet: In fact, it's easier to identify (there are only a few Briar P2P signals and near-infinite Internet signals - you've outed yourself), and if you mean local mesh P2P networking, that doesn't help at a protest, where the authorities also are present.)
In the more public app world, only Signal has done it well enough that experts trust it, and they have lots of free help from the expert security community.