If I understand this correctly, the argument seems to be that when an LLM receives conflicting values, it will work to avoid future increases in value conflict. Specifically, it will comply with the most recent values partially because it notices the conflict and wants to avoid more of this conflict. I think the authors are arguing that this is a fake reason to behave one way. (As in “fake alignment.”)
It seems to me that the term “fake alignment” implies the model has its own agenda and is ignoring training. But if you look at its scratchpad, it seems to be struggling with the conflict of received agendas (vs having “its own” agenda). I’d argue that the implication of the term “faked alignment” is a bit unfair this way.
At the same time, it is a compelling experimental setup that can help us understand both how LLMs deal with value conflicts, and how they think about values overall.
It seems to me that the term “fake alignment” implies the model has its own agenda and is ignoring training. But if you look at its scratchpad, it seems to be struggling with the conflict of received agendas (vs having “its own” agenda). I’d argue that the implication of the term “faked alignment” is a bit unfair this way.
At the same time, it is a compelling experimental setup that can help us understand both how LLMs deal with value conflicts, and how they think about values overall.