It's kinda fun, right? The whole point of tying executive compensation to share price was to have them have some rough stake in the business, but even that didn't prove enough: there's always a longer term, and doing a visible, clear NPV boost is usually accretive to market cap even if it introduces long-term risk, because the long term risks are usually hidden from public eye and very mushy.
Ironically, I think the poster child for how to properly structure compensation away from this is Hank Greenberg's AIG, where not only was his compensation basically all deferred stock options, they were deferred until retirement, so about as long-term a view as you can get. He was very risk-averse, and his biggest flaw wasn't under his operational ownership but under successor and personnel selection (looking at you, Welch).
But at some level, it was just bad people making bad calls. I don't think McNerney thought that this would wreck Boeing, he was just wrong. Even if he was left predictably destitute at the end of such a failure, he probably wouldn't have changed his choices because he thought they were good. You could claim that this is a failure of boards and governance (and, truly, I think boards are by and large really bad and I wish there was a much more pervasive activist investor culture) but at some level I'm not sure how much of this is solvable.
I don't know. There's probably a way to do boards well enough that this isn't a problem.
Ironically, I think the poster child for how to properly structure compensation away from this is Hank Greenberg's AIG, where not only was his compensation basically all deferred stock options, they were deferred until retirement, so about as long-term a view as you can get. He was very risk-averse, and his biggest flaw wasn't under his operational ownership but under successor and personnel selection (looking at you, Welch).
But at some level, it was just bad people making bad calls. I don't think McNerney thought that this would wreck Boeing, he was just wrong. Even if he was left predictably destitute at the end of such a failure, he probably wouldn't have changed his choices because he thought they were good. You could claim that this is a failure of boards and governance (and, truly, I think boards are by and large really bad and I wish there was a much more pervasive activist investor culture) but at some level I'm not sure how much of this is solvable.
I don't know. There's probably a way to do boards well enough that this isn't a problem.