Fantastic research by NinjaLab. One of the most interesting parts to me from Yubico's advisory is that the Webauthn protocols attestation [1] is also defeated by this local cloning. Could the protocol have been better designed to resist this local cloning attack?
> An attacker could exploit this issue to create a fraudulent YubiKey using the recovered attestation key. This would produce a valid FIDO attestation statement during the make credential resulting in a bypass of an organization’s authenticator model preference controls for affected YubiKey versions.
> An attacker could exploit this issue to create a fraudulent YubiKey using the recovered attestation key. This would produce a valid FIDO attestation statement during the make credential resulting in a bypass of an organization’s authenticator model preference controls for affected YubiKey versions.
1. https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#attestation