"If your users aren't targeted by active attackers" is doing a lot of work there, right? Because you can get that same level of security without an "end-to-end encryption library" --- just encrypt rows, and store the keys in localStorage, or (ick) by deriving keys from passwords, the way this seems to. All the cryptography can live on the server, and the keys can be pushed out to the client. Now you need an active attacker in order to mass-exfiltrate the database, which is what you're going for, right?
But again my real point is just that you've misnamed it. This isn't E2EE. The whole reason we have the term "E2EE" is to capture not trusting the server to manage cryptographic secrecy.
But again my real point is just that you've misnamed it. This isn't E2EE. The whole reason we have the term "E2EE" is to capture not trusting the server to manage cryptographic secrecy.