Something I've always noticed with the notion of Kolmogorov complexity is that the question of determining the lowest level of computation is problematic.
For example, in the article, the author first defines the basic idea of KC. But then they correctly point out that the basic idea depends very much on the exact language that is chosen. So they describe how theorists have defined the notion of universal computation. But even this adjustment doesn't seem to escape the fact the we still depend on a system of mathematical symbols to describe the theory. And the notion of a Turing machine itself depends on other abstract concepts such as time and space, each with their own inherent, conceptual complexity. What sorts of minds (i.e. brains) are required to make sense out of the theory and what physical system is required for them to operate correctly? If the definition of KC includes a notion of how complex the Turing machine is that is required to compute a string, then the further down you go, the less the difference in complexity should be between any one string and another. After all, they all exist in the same universe!
I guess it just goes to show how much the idea of KC lives in the realm of theory. As soon as you pose the question of complexity so abstractly, you invite in all kinds of theoretical considerations that make the meaning more slippery. That's why KC really doesn't deserve to be compared to Shannon entropy as it often is.
But let me draw a comparison anyway like I said you shouldn't! Because Alice from the article could also have made a strong argument against Bob by just pointing out that the Shannon entropy of his string was lower, which is very relevant in terms of the number of heads or tails and the likelihood of seeing a particular count of them.
For example, in the article, the author first defines the basic idea of KC. But then they correctly point out that the basic idea depends very much on the exact language that is chosen. So they describe how theorists have defined the notion of universal computation. But even this adjustment doesn't seem to escape the fact the we still depend on a system of mathematical symbols to describe the theory. And the notion of a Turing machine itself depends on other abstract concepts such as time and space, each with their own inherent, conceptual complexity. What sorts of minds (i.e. brains) are required to make sense out of the theory and what physical system is required for them to operate correctly? If the definition of KC includes a notion of how complex the Turing machine is that is required to compute a string, then the further down you go, the less the difference in complexity should be between any one string and another. After all, they all exist in the same universe!
I guess it just goes to show how much the idea of KC lives in the realm of theory. As soon as you pose the question of complexity so abstractly, you invite in all kinds of theoretical considerations that make the meaning more slippery. That's why KC really doesn't deserve to be compared to Shannon entropy as it often is.
But let me draw a comparison anyway like I said you shouldn't! Because Alice from the article could also have made a strong argument against Bob by just pointing out that the Shannon entropy of his string was lower, which is very relevant in terms of the number of heads or tails and the likelihood of seeing a particular count of them.