> They thought they did, but failed.
Oh, never mind then. Clearly since they thought they updated the dependency it's all good.
> Impossible to guarantee. A sophisticated enough attack ... It is impossible to so completely segment a network ...
While I will acknowledge that this seems to have been Equifax's approach to security (it's impossible to do completely so why bother doing it at all?), this is not widely accepted as a philosophy of security in any industry.
That a bank could still be robbed by a military incursion from a neighboring nation state is not sufficient reason to leave the vault door open overnight. The record abundantly shows [0] that Equifax had security protocols that were weak enough that no sophisticated actor was needed to bypass their protections.
As far as their failure to detect the breach, this is what the House investigation concluded:
> Equifax allowed over 300 security certificates to expire, including 79 certificates for monitoring business critical domains. Failure to renew an expired digital certificate for 19 months left Equifax without visibility on the exfiltration of data during the time of the cyberattack.
[0] https://oversight.house.gov/report/committee-releases-report...
Oh, never mind then. Clearly since they thought they updated the dependency it's all good.
> Impossible to guarantee. A sophisticated enough attack ... It is impossible to so completely segment a network ...
While I will acknowledge that this seems to have been Equifax's approach to security (it's impossible to do completely so why bother doing it at all?), this is not widely accepted as a philosophy of security in any industry.
That a bank could still be robbed by a military incursion from a neighboring nation state is not sufficient reason to leave the vault door open overnight. The record abundantly shows [0] that Equifax had security protocols that were weak enough that no sophisticated actor was needed to bypass their protections.
As far as their failure to detect the breach, this is what the House investigation concluded:
> Equifax allowed over 300 security certificates to expire, including 79 certificates for monitoring business critical domains. Failure to renew an expired digital certificate for 19 months left Equifax without visibility on the exfiltration of data during the time of the cyberattack.
[0] https://oversight.house.gov/report/committee-releases-report...