>Good founders that know they’re not the right ones to lead the next phase of the business know when to step aside.
The problem is that now we have the Facebook/Zuckerberg example, wherein the founder managed to take outside money, and even go public, while still protecting his absolutely control of the company.
As with most public firms, each Class A share owned gives you one vote. However, Meta also has Class B shares that give the owner TEN votes each -- and Zuck owns a simple majority of those Class B shares. His voting power means he can do whatever he wants regardless of what the Class A shareholders want. (Zuck is also both CEO and Chair of the board.)
The problem is that now we have the Facebook/Zuckerberg example, wherein the founder managed to take outside money, and even go public, while still protecting his absolutely control of the company.
As with most public firms, each Class A share owned gives you one vote. However, Meta also has Class B shares that give the owner TEN votes each -- and Zuck owns a simple majority of those Class B shares. His voting power means he can do whatever he wants regardless of what the Class A shareholders want. (Zuck is also both CEO and Chair of the board.)
https://www.morningstar.com/sustainable-investing/how-facebo...
This structure is weird, but not unique. The end result is that Zuck got to have his cake (public money) and eat it to (keep absolutely control).