The section on PIN code fraud really highlights the need to move away from code/password matching to cryptographic verification:
> The large number of port and transport personnel who are able to view these reference numbers — in some cases up to 10,000 people in a single shipping company — provides traffickers with many targets.
This is equivalent to storing passwords in plaintext. A code that is needed to actually access the goods (i.e. used as a password) should be stored as a cryptographic hash or signature, and then only the right parties can verify that signature, with middle men having no access to it.
No, it won't solve all forms of corruption, but it will take thousands of people out of the "bribable" (or worse, "intimidatable", as the article explains) category.
> The large number of port and transport personnel who are able to view these reference numbers — in some cases up to 10,000 people in a single shipping company — provides traffickers with many targets.
This is equivalent to storing passwords in plaintext. A code that is needed to actually access the goods (i.e. used as a password) should be stored as a cryptographic hash or signature, and then only the right parties can verify that signature, with middle men having no access to it.
No, it won't solve all forms of corruption, but it will take thousands of people out of the "bribable" (or worse, "intimidatable", as the article explains) category.