There was a post recently about suspicion of NIST, specifically from Daniel Bernstein. We also have reason to believe there was funny business around Dual_EC_DRBG.
If NIST really is up to no good on behalf of US intelligence agencies, it's reasonable to believe they'd be doing everything they can to prevent strong post-quantum crypto.
Also, here's an idea I had: let's say you wrapped a plaintext in three different encryption algorithms authored in adversarial countries. Even if you assume all three are backdoored by their creators, you'd have something that could only be unwrapped if the three adversarial countries worked together. Is there anything out there that does this?
If NIST really is up to no good on behalf of US intelligence agencies, it's reasonable to believe they'd be doing everything they can to prevent strong post-quantum crypto.
Also, here's an idea I had: let's say you wrapped a plaintext in three different encryption algorithms authored in adversarial countries. Even if you assume all three are backdoored by their creators, you'd have something that could only be unwrapped if the three adversarial countries worked together. Is there anything out there that does this?