This is probably not the place to write a full post-mortem, I will save that for a blog post or something, but here are a few points:
* 2008 was a really bad time to launch a chip startup
* Epiphany predated RISC-V...nobody wants a new ISA
* With <$7M raised in 9 years it was starved, there was no way to turn architeture into a good market fit (this would have required $50-$100M in tapeouts, CPU licensing, IO licensing, sw,sw,sw,,,). This is the problem we are trying to address now.
Epiphany did find some customer end applications (machine vision for example) and the Parallella board shipped in volume. The volumes and number of customers just wasn't big enough. Everybody wants to be the next ARM, Nvidia, but there is only room for 1-2 on earth.
* 2008 was a really bad time to launch a chip startup
* Epiphany predated RISC-V...nobody wants a new ISA
* With <$7M raised in 9 years it was starved, there was no way to turn architeture into a good market fit (this would have required $50-$100M in tapeouts, CPU licensing, IO licensing, sw,sw,sw,,,). This is the problem we are trying to address now.
Epiphany did find some customer end applications (machine vision for example) and the Parallella board shipped in volume. The volumes and number of customers just wasn't big enough. Everybody wants to be the next ARM, Nvidia, but there is only room for 1-2 on earth.