The issue described here, to my understanding, is that you find or create csam and then manipulate it so that its fingerprint collides with another image that you want to be flagged as csam. You then submit the manipulated version of the found or generated image to the authority.
First, at what point does the authority go "uh... Where did you get this from?" Practically speaking, the people doing this would have to be authorized law enforcement, no? Like if an ordinary citizen showed up with csam the excuse "oh I found this JPEG in a trunk in my late grandpa's attic" isn't gonna fly.
My assumption is that the central authority that compiles the database isn't just taking fingerprints, they want the actual source images. And I'm assuming they actually look at them to ensure they are, in fact, csam. Otherwise anyone could put anything into the database.
Now let me be very clear: I hate the idea of my device scanning for csam on principle. But what's the attack here? That someone looks at my device and determines that I do not, in fact, have csam? And that false positive might even be investigated and reveal that the bad actor sought out or generated CSAM for the purposes of perpetrating this! Which is even worse!
If the police want to look at your device, they can do that already through any number of other sketchy means that don't involve what's likely weeks of effort. The US searches phones at the border when they're feeling like it. I don't want to defend this stuff, but the potential for abuse in this specific case seems vanishingly small.
First, at what point does the authority go "uh... Where did you get this from?" Practically speaking, the people doing this would have to be authorized law enforcement, no? Like if an ordinary citizen showed up with csam the excuse "oh I found this JPEG in a trunk in my late grandpa's attic" isn't gonna fly.
My assumption is that the central authority that compiles the database isn't just taking fingerprints, they want the actual source images. And I'm assuming they actually look at them to ensure they are, in fact, csam. Otherwise anyone could put anything into the database.
Now let me be very clear: I hate the idea of my device scanning for csam on principle. But what's the attack here? That someone looks at my device and determines that I do not, in fact, have csam? And that false positive might even be investigated and reveal that the bad actor sought out or generated CSAM for the purposes of perpetrating this! Which is even worse!
If the police want to look at your device, they can do that already through any number of other sketchy means that don't involve what's likely weeks of effort. The US searches phones at the border when they're feeling like it. I don't want to defend this stuff, but the potential for abuse in this specific case seems vanishingly small.