Yeah, this one I went back-and-forth a lot during initial implementation. It's not easy to find a balance between making it dead simple and preventing abuse. I kept it simple as far as forwarding goes - an account must exist for the sender address or else the email is not processed. For save@, I was mostly worried about covertly updating/creating opportunities based on emails alone, so there is a step where the user has to take a manual action to confirm the email note assignment. For no@, all the same outcomes, but also the sender is bcc'ed on the decline email.
In other words, theoretically spoofing could occur, but there are compensating controls in place to minimize any damage. Given a very low likelihood of an attack in this direction, that felt like a reasonable compromise. Would love to get feedback on that though!
In other words, theoretically spoofing could occur, but there are compensating controls in place to minimize any damage. Given a very low likelihood of an attack in this direction, that felt like a reasonable compromise. Would love to get feedback on that though!