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Comment by movpasd

#2 is not actually equivalent to "at least one child is a boy". It is rather equivalent to "the first child is a boy". The difference may seem trivial, but one implies the other without the converse being true. This changes the probabilities — it's not an issue with underspecification.

I think your example #1 makes it much clearer why the 1/3 arises, at least in a frequentist analysis.

I would like to offer a similar interpretation but from a Bayesian lens. The 1/3 as rises due to the artificiality of the knowledge condition. Given real-world constraints, we expect any information collected to cleave neatly between the two children in our imagined information gathering scenario. So we implicitly translate "at least one child is a boy" to "we've checked one child, it's a boy".

Consider the following related problem: I have two faucets next to each other, each has a 50% chance of dripping overnight. I leave one shared bucket under both of them. The next day, the bucket is wet. What's the odds that _both_ faucets dripped?

This setup makes the correlative nature of the information much clearer, and I think most people would be less likely to jump to 1/2 as an answer.

parent movpasd 3 years ago

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