An interesting perspective I once heard from an information security expert is that there's a difference between risks and 'things that can go wrong'. Something is only an actual risk if it hurts the bottom-line. In particular quite a few things that can go wrong don't carry that much risk, and conversely something that is hard but not impossible to go wrong may carry huge amounts of risk.
The trick with this perspective is that after identifying the real risks you can then link the risks and possible mitigations by looking at all 'things' and identifying the ways in which they might fail (and how this may be prevented from happening). This way you can easily identify which mitigations are helping prevent risks and which risks are not sufficiently mitigated. It's a fair bit of work, but it's not complicated and often gives useful insights.
What this article basically does is note that you should first asses what risks a failed deployment has, and correctly states that in quite a few cases this risk is low and therefore the mitigations (of which there can be many) may not be necessary and may in fact be doing harm without actually sufficiently preventing any risk.
The trick with this perspective is that after identifying the real risks you can then link the risks and possible mitigations by looking at all 'things' and identifying the ways in which they might fail (and how this may be prevented from happening). This way you can easily identify which mitigations are helping prevent risks and which risks are not sufficiently mitigated. It's a fair bit of work, but it's not complicated and often gives useful insights.
What this article basically does is note that you should first asses what risks a failed deployment has, and correctly states that in quite a few cases this risk is low and therefore the mitigations (of which there can be many) may not be necessary and may in fact be doing harm without actually sufficiently preventing any risk.