The author might call Nichomachean Ethics "ancient"; I'd call it "unrefined".
>Virtue is a state “consisting in a mean,” Aristotle maintains, and this mean “is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would define it.” (For Aristotle, the “mean” represented a point between opposite excesses—for instance, between cowardice and recklessness lay courage.)
The idea of virtue being a mean is an unchecked assumption, from oversimplified matters.
Reusing the example with the cowardice-courage-recklessness triplet: suppose for a moment a fool that acts only when it is not necessary to act; he runs away from an ant, but throws himself into a fight against a pack of lions. The fool in question is, at the same time, coward and reckless, but he is not courageous.
You might say "he's being coward or reckless on different circumstances"; and you'd be right. This shows that there's a second dimension to take into account here, besides "ability to act": it's "ability to detect when to act". And once you do this split, you notice that courage is not a mean between cowardice and recklessness; it's simply the opposite of cowardice, with recklessness having another opposite (let's call it "carefulness").
I'm not too eager to assume that _all_ virtues work like this, but the presence of at least one virtue not behaving this way already shows that Aristotle's "virtue as a mean" concept is flawed and assumptive.
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Another issue; from the book. Aristotle makes an unholy mess of what's good for the individual and what's good for society, around book III; almost like he was preaching "hey if you want happiness/eudaimonia you should have arete/virtue~". Things simply don't work like this on an individual level - you can be the biggest arsehole in the village and still potentially live a happy, meaningful life. Or live in virtue and miserable.
>Virtue is a state “consisting in a mean,” Aristotle maintains, and this mean “is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would define it.” (For Aristotle, the “mean” represented a point between opposite excesses—for instance, between cowardice and recklessness lay courage.)
The idea of virtue being a mean is an unchecked assumption, from oversimplified matters.
Reusing the example with the cowardice-courage-recklessness triplet: suppose for a moment a fool that acts only when it is not necessary to act; he runs away from an ant, but throws himself into a fight against a pack of lions. The fool in question is, at the same time, coward and reckless, but he is not courageous.
You might say "he's being coward or reckless on different circumstances"; and you'd be right. This shows that there's a second dimension to take into account here, besides "ability to act": it's "ability to detect when to act". And once you do this split, you notice that courage is not a mean between cowardice and recklessness; it's simply the opposite of cowardice, with recklessness having another opposite (let's call it "carefulness").
I'm not too eager to assume that _all_ virtues work like this, but the presence of at least one virtue not behaving this way already shows that Aristotle's "virtue as a mean" concept is flawed and assumptive.
_________________
Another issue; from the book. Aristotle makes an unholy mess of what's good for the individual and what's good for society, around book III; almost like he was preaching "hey if you want happiness/eudaimonia you should have arete/virtue~". Things simply don't work like this on an individual level - you can be the biggest arsehole in the village and still potentially live a happy, meaningful life. Or live in virtue and miserable.