While I agree with this premise, taking an extreme view, practically all software which users routinely update are vulnerable to the first party / author being compelled to ship a harmful release.
The lack of a distribution trust model for the web has long bummed me out, but even snake oil E2EE
is a good thing because it makes an active (and potentially detectable) intervention necessary to exploit a client.
Supply chain attacks remain a huge mess. Unless you can validate the worthiness and authenticity of an update, or sandbox it sufficiently, most software can become a threat.
A more manual, opt-in update process for web apps (via service workers) would be a nice innovation, but I doubt it would provide much more safety to non technical end users, since the harder question is whether a particular update is harmful. Solving that verification problem is the crux of the issue regardless of how rapidly software updates.
The lack of a distribution trust model for the web has long bummed me out, but even snake oil E2EE is a good thing because it makes an active (and potentially detectable) intervention necessary to exploit a client.
Supply chain attacks remain a huge mess. Unless you can validate the worthiness and authenticity of an update, or sandbox it sufficiently, most software can become a threat.
A more manual, opt-in update process for web apps (via service workers) would be a nice innovation, but I doubt it would provide much more safety to non technical end users, since the harder question is whether a particular update is harmful. Solving that verification problem is the crux of the issue regardless of how rapidly software updates.