Even just as a fancy checksum I think it has some value, and I think it does serve some security goals. I feel like this article also kind of amounts to listing off a bunch of threats that aren't being properly mitigated, and it doesn't really do a good job of separating which threats are not mitigated because of intrinsic deficiencies in PGP from which threats are not mitigated because other parts of the system haven't even made an attempt to mitigate the threat.
And then there's the third category, which is "threats which could be mitigated but PGP makes this hard so people tried and gave up." Just giving up entirely doesn't seem like the right reaction here, and that seems to be what the PGP downers are advocating.
And then there's the third category, which is "threats which could be mitigated but PGP makes this hard so people tried and gave up." Just giving up entirely doesn't seem like the right reaction here, and that seems to be what the PGP downers are advocating.