"Motivated by Windows 11’s push to use the TPM
for even more applications, we apply the vulnerability
to Microsoft BitLocker and show the first fTPM-based
attack against the popular Full Disk Encryption solution.
BitLocker’s default TPM-only strategy manages – without
any changes to the user experience – to swiftly step up
a user’s security in the face of a lost or stolen device.
However, as our work complements the established at-
tacks against dTPMs with an even more potent attack
against AMD fTPMs, a TPM-only configuration lulls a
non-technical user with high protection needs into a false
sense of security."
"Users who fear a physical attacker with reasonable
resources should opt for a TPM and PIN configuration.
When BitLocker identifies that the underlying TPM is
an fTPM, users should be urged to turn their PIN into
a passphrase."
"Motivated by Windows 11’s push to use the TPM for even more applications, we apply the vulnerability to Microsoft BitLocker and show the first fTPM-based attack against the popular Full Disk Encryption solution. BitLocker’s default TPM-only strategy manages – without any changes to the user experience – to swiftly step up a user’s security in the face of a lost or stolen device. However, as our work complements the established at- tacks against dTPMs with an even more potent attack against AMD fTPMs, a TPM-only configuration lulls a non-technical user with high protection needs into a false sense of security."
"Users who fear a physical attacker with reasonable resources should opt for a TPM and PIN configuration. When BitLocker identifies that the underlying TPM is an fTPM, users should be urged to turn their PIN into a passphrase."