54% of SVB’s loan book was loans “to” VCs and PEs, but they weren’t loans based upon the funds’ portfolio holdings. They were Capital Call lines, based on the power of the VC to demand that its LPs make good on capital commitments.
(Yes, the fund portfolio holdings were pledged as additional collateral here but that’s secondary. The only thing that could make the CCLOC outstandings get marked down is if the well-heeled institutions and individuals who’ve committed to VC funds stop making their capital calls.)
Even SVB is not crazy enough to lever up against VC portfolio marks.
(Yes, the fund portfolio holdings were pledged as additional collateral here but that’s secondary. The only thing that could make the CCLOC outstandings get marked down is if the well-heeled institutions and individuals who’ve committed to VC funds stop making their capital calls.)
Even SVB is not crazy enough to lever up against VC portfolio marks.