Mate, you could just read the code…or give it a try ;)
> the WG author seems like he doesn't care about PQC
This is plainly not true; WG supports post-quantum security with the use of the PSK mechanism as we do.
PQ-crypto is high quality but it is also new and fairly inefficient; not a good thing to integrate into the kernel directly. Using the PSK mechanism is the best way to do this I know of at this point in time.
> It's also not clear how the WG PSK change is coordinated, and whether that entails a brief loss of connectivity - packet loss, latency spike.
WireGuard establishes a session with the existing PSK; we replace the PSK every two minutes but WireGuard keeps its established session around until it renegotiates a session.
Both WG and RP rekey their session every two minutes; there is no interruption.
Mate, you could just read the code…or give it a try ;)
> the WG author seems like he doesn't care about PQC
This is plainly not true; WG supports post-quantum security with the use of the PSK mechanism as we do. PQ-crypto is high quality but it is also new and fairly inefficient; not a good thing to integrate into the kernel directly. Using the PSK mechanism is the best way to do this I know of at this point in time.
> It's also not clear how the WG PSK change is coordinated, and whether that entails a brief loss of connectivity - packet loss, latency spike.
WireGuard establishes a session with the existing PSK; we replace the PSK every two minutes but WireGuard keeps its established session around until it renegotiates a session.
Both WG and RP rekey their session every two minutes; there is no interruption.