Related to this would be Nagel's paper, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" We can't say what sort of echolocation sensation a bat has anymore than Mary can say what a color looks like before she leaves the black and white room. We're in the same position when it comes to bird vision. We can't say what the world would look like with four primary colors. What does that fourth primary color look like? We don't have a word for it because we don't see that color.
Or for that matter, what would the rest of the EM spectrum look like if we could see it all? What would a scientific theory that could answer these sorts of questions look like?
Saying physicalism is false because it can't answer the questions above is not to say naturalism is false. There's no magic or supernatural stuff here. It just means our scientific description of the world lacks the subjective. There is a fundamental epistemological limit to our ability to know how to combine the two. It doesn't mean the world itself has such a division. We just can't cognate how to reconcile the two.
Or for that matter, what would the rest of the EM spectrum look like if we could see it all? What would a scientific theory that could answer these sorts of questions look like?
Saying physicalism is false because it can't answer the questions above is not to say naturalism is false. There's no magic or supernatural stuff here. It just means our scientific description of the world lacks the subjective. There is a fundamental epistemological limit to our ability to know how to combine the two. It doesn't mean the world itself has such a division. We just can't cognate how to reconcile the two.