In today's arms race of exploits, you need to operate and prepare your interactions with computers with a defined threat scenario. This is never-ending.
> Linux creator Linus Torvalds famously rejected such warnings, arguing that such exploits weren’t practical.
And I would certainly agree with Linus, here's why:
> Retbleed can leak kernel memory from Intel CPUs at about 219 bytes per second and with 98 percent accuracy.
Retbleed adds more credence to this idea of impractical-yet-technically-feasible exploits; where do you draw the line? Do you choose to be vulnerable to this 219 bytes per second leak at the cost of 28% CPU overhead? I would imagine, one could toggle on or off the mitigations they'd want with the implications provided in the future via modifying BIOS settings.
> Linux creator Linus Torvalds famously rejected such warnings, arguing that such exploits weren’t practical.
And I would certainly agree with Linus, here's why:
> Retbleed can leak kernel memory from Intel CPUs at about 219 bytes per second and with 98 percent accuracy.
Retbleed adds more credence to this idea of impractical-yet-technically-feasible exploits; where do you draw the line? Do you choose to be vulnerable to this 219 bytes per second leak at the cost of 28% CPU overhead? I would imagine, one could toggle on or off the mitigations they'd want with the implications provided in the future via modifying BIOS settings.