And this is why Whonix is critical - because even
when you pop the browser, you still have another layer of protection - the gateway VM.
Tails browser on [almost anything] is one browser exploit away from beaconing out directly from your IP, and has done so rather frequently over the years.
Whonix stuffs the whole browser and such into a workstation VM, which is only connected to the gateway VM - which "torifies" everything coming in that port. So even if you pop the workstation and have root, you still can't beacon out directly without going through the gateway - you'd have to find an exploit in that bit as well, with only network access. Not impossible, but a lot harder.
And then package all that into Qubes and use it that way, because a disposable Whonix VM set is probably the safest way to browse the web...
And still disable Javascript.
Tails browser on [almost anything] is one browser exploit away from beaconing out directly from your IP, and has done so rather frequently over the years.
Whonix stuffs the whole browser and such into a workstation VM, which is only connected to the gateway VM - which "torifies" everything coming in that port. So even if you pop the workstation and have root, you still can't beacon out directly without going through the gateway - you'd have to find an exploit in that bit as well, with only network access. Not impossible, but a lot harder.
And then package all that into Qubes and use it that way, because a disposable Whonix VM set is probably the safest way to browse the web...
And still disable Javascript.