Yep. Actually the behavior of IRV is extremely unintuitive (despite how nice it sounds). Even using very simple models that assume every voter has political opinions completely described by a 2d political compass, prefers candidates that are closer to them on the compass, and that voters are normally distributed around a central point, you get very strange behavior! Here are some diagrams that illustrate the effect: https://rangevoting.org/IEVS/Pictures.html
interestingly, IRV is not even monotonic! It's easy to construct a situation where converting people to have the same ranking as you causes you to get a candidate you like less. (The concave parts of the voronoi diagrams describe areas where this happens.) If you're curious about this, a few years back some friends and I tried to make a video describing this phenomenon: [0]. (Our editing and presentation skills are nothing to write home about but I think the video is interesting.)
interestingly, IRV is not even monotonic! It's easy to construct a situation where converting people to have the same ranking as you causes you to get a candidate you like less. (The concave parts of the voronoi diagrams describe areas where this happens.) If you're curious about this, a few years back some friends and I tried to make a video describing this phenomenon: [0]. (Our editing and presentation skills are nothing to write home about but I think the video is interesting.)
[0]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0m7vtt9jXpM