What they want is to sneak Palladium in through the back door. The future of the x86 platform is a signed code path from power-on to application code. Even Linux thought leaders, like Lennart and Matthew Garrett, are on board with this idea. The problem is, as we learned with ActiveX, code signing cannot attest that code is safe, only that it came from a particular place. But then again, the goal of verifying where code comes from is not safety, it's control over who gets to run code on the platform. And who has that control? Who is the only CA recognized as authoritative by hardware OEMs for Secure Boot purposes?
Microsoft.
Remember, you run Linux on modern hardware only because Microsoft allows you to. Microsoft signed the Red Hat shim, and if you disabled Secure Boot, it's only because a Microsoft policy gave you the ability to disable it -- a policy they can later reverse.
Microsoft.
Remember, you run Linux on modern hardware only because Microsoft allows you to. Microsoft signed the Red Hat shim, and if you disabled Secure Boot, it's only because a Microsoft policy gave you the ability to disable it -- a policy they can later reverse.