I used to think there must be something 'special' to brains to distinguish us from computers. There isn't. Brains encode finite amounts of information (quantum mechanics seems to imply bounded local information). We are a huge information network ourselves -- that's what consciousness is (with some added bits like self-identity and various particulars structures that dictate the
character of our experience).
But that doesn't mean brains aren't special -- it means brains are special and computers are special. Even more: it seems to imply computers, AI, etc. can be as special as ourselves, sentient, and perhaps even more special in ways we haven't realized yet.
It's difficult to even imagine a physical theory with unbounded local information. It seems to open the possibility to crazy things like hypercomputation, which do not seem very well defined. (For example: every 1-1/n seconds, (n>1) from now, flip a switch ON/OFF. At what state will the switch be at t>1s? An at exactly t=1s?)
Note: while information and information flow itself bounded (hence no hypercomputation), I don't know of any obvious objections to continuous time. (I'm not sure the continuity of time has any profound implications)
But that doesn't mean brains aren't special -- it means brains are special and computers are special. Even more: it seems to imply computers, AI, etc. can be as special as ourselves, sentient, and perhaps even more special in ways we haven't realized yet.
It's difficult to even imagine a physical theory with unbounded local information. It seems to open the possibility to crazy things like hypercomputation, which do not seem very well defined. (For example: every 1-1/n seconds, (n>1) from now, flip a switch ON/OFF. At what state will the switch be at t>1s? An at exactly t=1s?)
Note: while information and information flow itself bounded (hence no hypercomputation), I don't know of any obvious objections to continuous time. (I'm not sure the continuity of time has any profound implications)