> This immediately produces an incentive for both the network to make use of as much computational capacity as possible to keep itself safe, and for any attacker to amass enough computational capacity to mount an attack
This seems false to me. Could you elaborate on what incentives you see at play here?
On another note, I feel one of the finest design details of Bitcoin is that its "decentralization-failure-mode", a.k.a. under a 50ish-percent-attack, is technically indistinguishable from normal operation.
2. The DID spec doesn't require the use of Bitcoin. So we agree with your last statement-disguised-as-question. Thus, it shouldn't have been listed as a reason for the rejection of the proposal (which spawned this thread)
> This immediately produces an incentive for both the network to make use of as much computational capacity as possible to keep itself safe, and for any attacker to amass enough computational capacity to mount an attack
This seems false to me. Could you elaborate on what incentives you see at play here?
On another note, I feel one of the finest design details of Bitcoin is that its "decentralization-failure-mode", a.k.a. under a 50ish-percent-attack, is technically indistinguishable from normal operation.
2. The DID spec doesn't require the use of Bitcoin. So we agree with your last statement-disguised-as-question. Thus, it shouldn't have been listed as a reason for the rejection of the proposal (which spawned this thread)