Okay, I buy that, you can have a justified belief that isn't true, if justification is itself subjective/probabilistic rather than deductive.
Then this paper argues that you can have a justified belief that is true, but still isn't knowledge. Why? Because the justification is faulty. Well sure, since we've admitted in the first place that justifications can be faulty. So why would you ever assume that they invariably lead to knowledge? Had the concept of believing right thing for the wrong reasons not been invented in the 1960s?
I just can't get myself into a mindset where this is a revelatory finding, but maybe I'm too steeped in a bayesian worldview.
Then this paper argues that you can have a justified belief that is true, but still isn't knowledge. Why? Because the justification is faulty. Well sure, since we've admitted in the first place that justifications can be faulty. So why would you ever assume that they invariably lead to knowledge? Had the concept of believing right thing for the wrong reasons not been invented in the 1960s?
I just can't get myself into a mindset where this is a revelatory finding, but maybe I'm too steeped in a bayesian worldview.