Suppose a bad actor tries to double spend. They have to cryptographically sign both transactions, so the whole network will eventually receive knowledge of both transactions.
Why can't the network simply wait for some duration of time before accepting a transaction, to verify that no double-spends propagate from elsewhere?
If double spending is ever detected from a party, that party is dis-trusted by the network. The network will de-prioritize processing transactions from dis-trusted parties. Problem solved?
Suppose a bad actor tries to double spend. They have to cryptographically sign both transactions, so the whole network will eventually receive knowledge of both transactions.
Why can't the network simply wait for some duration of time before accepting a transaction, to verify that no double-spends propagate from elsewhere?
If double spending is ever detected from a party, that party is dis-trusted by the network. The network will de-prioritize processing transactions from dis-trusted parties. Problem solved?