I would much rather live in a world where there are viable options for responding to a handful of ICBMs that don't involve escalation.
Effectively, a credible ballistic missile defense + an arms treaty that caps the number of interceptors leaves relative great power parity stable.
But it does eliminate the "rogue state" or "rogue silo" threat. And arguably, makes them less attractive to pursue in the first place, thereby furthering non-proliferation.
If you're Iran, are you going to suffer all the economic pain of breaking sanctions, in return for a non-credible threat?
Effectively, a credible ballistic missile defense + an arms treaty that caps the number of interceptors leaves relative great power parity stable.
But it does eliminate the "rogue state" or "rogue silo" threat. And arguably, makes them less attractive to pursue in the first place, thereby furthering non-proliferation.
If you're Iran, are you going to suffer all the economic pain of breaking sanctions, in return for a non-credible threat?