> But complaining about either regulation or bureaucracy at a general level is the policy equivalent of approaching software by making general complaints about how terrible existing code is: sure, some of it is probably sub-optimal and should be rewritten, but anyone who's worked in the field for a while knows that the sweep-it-away/ground-up-rewrite impulse is more often wrong than applying Chesterton's fence (make sure you understand why it's there), profiling, and examine potential alternatives against studied outcomes.
This is sometimes true, but it certainly isn't always true. Housing policy, for instance, is largely driven by putting the interests of local property owners over those of new entrants and the broader economy.
> Sure. And would love to chase the wealthiest end of demand and externalize costs of community displacement or ecological impact.
Price the externalities. It's as simple as that. Nobody needs to externalize anything. Housing is plenty worth building to developers even if they fully internalize the ecological impact. And let's not neglect the ecological impact of long commutes when running this calculation.
> And would love to externalize the costs of risk and waste management.
Of course they'd like to do that. Everyone would like to externalize their costs and risks. The job of government is to let people do things, but force them to internalize the costs. You aren't making an argument against anything I said.
> They're arguments about specific incentives absent intentional oversight, supporting the general case that it is often irresponsible to believe or advocate that incentives tend towards optimal on their own, and that the primary problem is oversight itself.
Oversight is fine. Kafkaesque bureacracy and cost disease are not. The present state of our regulatory apparatus is abysmal. That isn't an argument for eliminating it, it's an argument for making it better.
This is sometimes true, but it certainly isn't always true. Housing policy, for instance, is largely driven by putting the interests of local property owners over those of new entrants and the broader economy.
> Sure. And would love to chase the wealthiest end of demand and externalize costs of community displacement or ecological impact.
Price the externalities. It's as simple as that. Nobody needs to externalize anything. Housing is plenty worth building to developers even if they fully internalize the ecological impact. And let's not neglect the ecological impact of long commutes when running this calculation.
> And would love to externalize the costs of risk and waste management.
Of course they'd like to do that. Everyone would like to externalize their costs and risks. The job of government is to let people do things, but force them to internalize the costs. You aren't making an argument against anything I said.
> They're arguments about specific incentives absent intentional oversight, supporting the general case that it is often irresponsible to believe or advocate that incentives tend towards optimal on their own, and that the primary problem is oversight itself.
Oversight is fine. Kafkaesque bureacracy and cost disease are not. The present state of our regulatory apparatus is abysmal. That isn't an argument for eliminating it, it's an argument for making it better.