> Using the Jitter RNG core, the rngd provides an entropy source that feeds into the Linux /dev/random device if its entropy runs low. It updates the /dev/random entropy estimator such that the newly provided entropy unblocks /dev/random.
They made a very questionable decision based on the sort of ignorance that leads people to use /dev/random and haveged rather than RtlGenRandom (Windows), getrandom(2) (new Linux), or /dev/urandom (old Linux).
Cryptography engineering requires care and this sort of ignorance tends to undermine secure implementations.
> Using the Jitter RNG core, the rngd provides an entropy source that feeds into the Linux /dev/random device if its entropy runs low. It updates the /dev/random entropy estimator such that the newly provided entropy unblocks /dev/random.
This is a red flag. Entropy doesn't run low. https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom
I'm calling it now: Don't use VeraCrypt.
They made a very questionable decision based on the sort of ignorance that leads people to use /dev/random and haveged rather than RtlGenRandom (Windows), getrandom(2) (new Linux), or /dev/urandom (old Linux).
Cryptography engineering requires care and this sort of ignorance tends to undermine secure implementations.