EFF is special in that is completely disregards legitimate use cases to access information.
I thought civil liberties was about fine tuning the scope of the government's power from sweeping in innocent citizens. EFF doesn't attempt to suggest a statute to do a better job in these areas. It lumps together a complicated subject.
They appear to believe any reason the government has to want to access E2E communication is illegitimate.
> Facebook and others would face immense pressure to also provide them to authoritarian regimes, who might seek to spy on dissidents in the name of combatting terrorism or civil unrest, for example.
It's blocked in China. Russians use VK.
> Many people—including journalists, human rights activists, and those at risk of abuse by intimate partners—use encryption to stay safe in the physical world as well as the online one.
If someone's safety was at risk, why would they be on Facebook at all though.
They sell their data in bulk. Maybe what you really want is a GDPR-like assurance as a consumer.
> “enable law enforcement to obtain lawful access to content in a readable and usable format.”
It's public information this is already done by large companies.
Why not make this into a conversation about who can access the data, for what reasons, and what threshhold of proof is needed to minimize the sweep?
> law enforcement and national security agencies in these three countries are asking for nothing less than access to every conversation that crosses every digital device.
Law enforcement and national security are not the same thing.
They're exacerbated by places like EFF that blur them together to get donations and keep laypeople running in circles.
EFF is supposed to be staffed with lawyers. The least it could do is help the public understand the intricacies.
I thought civil liberties was about fine tuning the scope of the government's power from sweeping in innocent citizens. EFF doesn't attempt to suggest a statute to do a better job in these areas. It lumps together a complicated subject.
They appear to believe any reason the government has to want to access E2E communication is illegitimate.
> Facebook and others would face immense pressure to also provide them to authoritarian regimes, who might seek to spy on dissidents in the name of combatting terrorism or civil unrest, for example.
It's blocked in China. Russians use VK.
> Many people—including journalists, human rights activists, and those at risk of abuse by intimate partners—use encryption to stay safe in the physical world as well as the online one.
If someone's safety was at risk, why would they be on Facebook at all though.
They sell their data in bulk. Maybe what you really want is a GDPR-like assurance as a consumer.
> “enable law enforcement to obtain lawful access to content in a readable and usable format.”
It's public information this is already done by large companies.
Why not make this into a conversation about who can access the data, for what reasons, and what threshhold of proof is needed to minimize the sweep?
> law enforcement and national security agencies in these three countries are asking for nothing less than access to every conversation that crosses every digital device.
Law enforcement and national security are not the same thing.
They're exacerbated by places like EFF that blur them together to get donations and keep laypeople running in circles.
EFF is supposed to be staffed with lawyers. The least it could do is help the public understand the intricacies.