The court later issued a clarification basically upholding the logic of their ruling but stating that because the chalking was part of valid [regulatory] activities (below) the chalking is okay[0].
> Rather, we hold, based on the pleading stage of this litigation, that two exceptions to the warrant requirement—the “community caretaking” exception and the motor-vehicle exception—do not apply here. Our holding extends no further than this.
From the court's order[1]:
> Because we chalk this practice up to a regulatory exercise, rather than a community-caretaking function, we REVERSE.
> Rather, we hold, based on the pleading stage of this litigation, that two exceptions to the warrant requirement—the “community caretaking” exception and the motor-vehicle exception—do not apply here. Our holding extends no further than this.
From the court's order[1]:
> Because we chalk this practice up to a regulatory exercise, rather than a community-caretaking function, we REVERSE.
[0] https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/recent-cases/sixth... [1] https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/17...