We could call this historical period a great dis-integration where the consensus that formed the equilibrium of the last 60 years has been disrupted by tech, and we're looking at a period of volatility before reaching a new equilibrium.
I've argued before that U.S. critical infrastructure vulnerability will prevent it from intervening in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Its lack of a strong homeland defensive posture on infrastructure has emboldened regional powers like China, Russia, and Iran to assert themselves over local NATO allies without fear of US retaliation. e.g. The US isn't going to risk a dam flooding or a long term grid failure over a distant minor ally. Arguably, NATO made sense when partners could defend their infrastructure, but the mutual aid commitment becomes a suicide pact when your cities can be turned into tribal warzones by depriving them of power, payments, and fuel. Nobody wants to get drawn into that by a minor ally.
That's the weakness that creates the power vacuum into which warring parties pile in. We do indeed live in interesting times.
I've argued before that U.S. critical infrastructure vulnerability will prevent it from intervening in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Its lack of a strong homeland defensive posture on infrastructure has emboldened regional powers like China, Russia, and Iran to assert themselves over local NATO allies without fear of US retaliation. e.g. The US isn't going to risk a dam flooding or a long term grid failure over a distant minor ally. Arguably, NATO made sense when partners could defend their infrastructure, but the mutual aid commitment becomes a suicide pact when your cities can be turned into tribal warzones by depriving them of power, payments, and fuel. Nobody wants to get drawn into that by a minor ally.
That's the weakness that creates the power vacuum into which warring parties pile in. We do indeed live in interesting times.