Somewhat related: if there were a shared password between the client and server, Password Authenticated Key Exchange techniques [0] could offer protection even when the server CA was compromised. PAKEs use zero-knowledge proof techniques to assert that each side already had password material (and derive a key from it) without revealing what the actual password was if the other side didn't have it to begin with.
In this case, only connections where a password was already agreed on would be protected vs. general unauthenticated browsing.
There was a draft proposal to add PAKE support to TLS 1.3, but it appears to have unfortunately expired [1].
In this case, only connections where a password was already agreed on would be protected vs. general unauthenticated browsing.
There was a draft proposal to add PAKE support to TLS 1.3, but it appears to have unfortunately expired [1].
0: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password-authenticated_key_agr... 1: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-barnes-tls-pake-04