This article repeats the claim that the MCAS software was faulty, but is there any evidence of coding-level errors? There is the systems engineering failure of not comparing the two available AofA sensors to detect faults, if not going for at least triple-redundancy, but the root cause there is not a coding error.
It has been suggested that high AofA readings should have been rejected unconditionally, but that approach can have its own problems, as in AF447 where the stall warnings stopped as the airplane became more deeply stalled. One should not leave the decision as whether to do that up to the programmer's discretion.
It has been suggested that high AofA readings should have been rejected unconditionally, but that approach can have its own problems, as in AF447 where the stall warnings stopped as the airplane became more deeply stalled. One should not leave the decision as whether to do that up to the programmer's discretion.