The BCP recommends either sending back client_id and iss (but that draft[1] is long expired, and nobody seems to support that implementation), or asking the client to provider a separate exact-match return URI for each AS. The second solution is what I'm doing when implementing multi-AS/IdP OAuth clients, but this requires the clients to be aware of this vulnerability, and that's a rather tall requirement.
The BCP recommends either sending back client_id and iss (but that draft[1] is long expired, and nobody seems to support that implementation), or asking the client to provider a separate exact-match return URI for each AS. The second solution is what I'm doing when implementing multi-AS/IdP OAuth clients, but this requires the clients to be aware of this vulnerability, and that's a rather tall requirement.
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-mix-up-mitigati...