> Sure, I wasn't objecting, it just made it a bit unclear what you meant by that first question ...
Sorry about that, I wasn't explicit with that as part of my intention.
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> By looking for statements that as input for their evaluation depend on something that is not just a matter of definition.
How would a claim only depending on something that is just a matter of definition indicate that it is not about reality?
How do you determine whether a claim depends on something that is not just a matter of definition?
Isn't the claim "1 + 9 = 10" a claim about reality by virtue of it being a claim (because a claim asserts something as true, and to be true is to be in accordance with reality, so "1 + 9 = 10" is to say that "'1 + 9 = 10' is in accordance with reality")?
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> The problem with your analogy is that that diamond (or its absence) is represented, in the form of the diamond (or its absence).
Is this to say that the diamond is its representation?
> It's a claim about external reality, or a description of a pattern in external (physical) reality. That pattern is there, even without anyone conceptualizing it.
Would this mean math doesn't exist outside of the brain because it doesn't have "a pattern in external (physical) reality"?
Assuming only physical reality exists, wouldn't that make math a physical part of the brain?
> Claims about mathematics are inherently linked to those definitions, and to those rules of evaluation.
Are definitions and rules of evaluation physical?
> A closer analogy would be about "a diamond on the moon", with "the moon" having no referent. Does "a diamond is on the moon" have a truth value if there is no moon?
Agreed. What indicates that the statement "1 < 2" has no referent?
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>>>>> Making the assumption that there is such a thing as immaterial Peano axioms seems to me as reasonable as making the assumption that there is such a thing as immaterial cake.
>>>> So what material(s) are the Peano axioms composed of?
>>> That's a category error?
>> Are you asking me or telling me? If you're telling me it is a category error, why?
> I am telling you, because axioms are not made of a material.
>> Do you think that the Peano axioms are material or not material?
> I would tend towards saying that they are not material, in the same way that I would say that movies are not material. But that does not mean that I think that the Peano axioms can be said to exist absent a material representation, just as I wouldn't think that movies can be said to exist absent a material representation.
> An expression of the form "movies are not material" only says something about which aspects are relevant to the abstraction, not about the underlying reality of instances of movies.
Would the equivalent statement for axioms therefore say "An expression of the form "axioms are not material" only says something about which aspects are relevant to the abstraction, not about the underlying reality of instances of axioms"?
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> Would you also say that electrons are part of non-physical reality, for example? Mind you, we have never observed electrons themselves!
Depends on how you are defining "observe". Regarding electrons, the effects they produce indicates interactions that are physical in nature.
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>> Implicit in my reason is the claim that when one acts according to God's will they will attain maximal joy/happiness.
> Well, sure, but then that's still mostly just the same claim using different words, not a reason to be convinced it's actually true?
You never asked for reasons to be convinced it's true. You asked for reasons to care.
> And the global maximum of eating pleasure is achieved through eating according to Jane's will for your entire life, so don't let dips in local pleasure deter you from abiding by Jane's will.
> Are you convinced yet that eating the way Jane wants you to is the way to go? If not, why not?
If you cared to attain maximum eating pleasure and you believed of Jane that the maximum eating pleasure could be achieved through eating according to Jane's will your entire life, then Jane's will would be the way to go.
To parallel:
If you cared to attain maximum joy/happiness and you believed of God that the maximum joy/happiness could be achieved through acting according to God's will your entire life, the God's will would be the way to go.
Sorry about that, I wasn't explicit with that as part of my intention.
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> By looking for statements that as input for their evaluation depend on something that is not just a matter of definition.
How would a claim only depending on something that is just a matter of definition indicate that it is not about reality?
How do you determine whether a claim depends on something that is not just a matter of definition?
Isn't the claim "1 + 9 = 10" a claim about reality by virtue of it being a claim (because a claim asserts something as true, and to be true is to be in accordance with reality, so "1 + 9 = 10" is to say that "'1 + 9 = 10' is in accordance with reality")?
================================================================================
> The problem with your analogy is that that diamond (or its absence) is represented, in the form of the diamond (or its absence).
Is this to say that the diamond is its representation?
> It's a claim about external reality, or a description of a pattern in external (physical) reality. That pattern is there, even without anyone conceptualizing it.
Would this mean math doesn't exist outside of the brain because it doesn't have "a pattern in external (physical) reality"?
Assuming only physical reality exists, wouldn't that make math a physical part of the brain?
> Claims about mathematics are inherently linked to those definitions, and to those rules of evaluation.
Are definitions and rules of evaluation physical?
> A closer analogy would be about "a diamond on the moon", with "the moon" having no referent. Does "a diamond is on the moon" have a truth value if there is no moon?
Agreed. What indicates that the statement "1 < 2" has no referent?
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>>>>> Making the assumption that there is such a thing as immaterial Peano axioms seems to me as reasonable as making the assumption that there is such a thing as immaterial cake.
>>>> So what material(s) are the Peano axioms composed of?
>>> That's a category error?
>> Are you asking me or telling me? If you're telling me it is a category error, why?
> I am telling you, because axioms are not made of a material.
>> Do you think that the Peano axioms are material or not material?
> I would tend towards saying that they are not material, in the same way that I would say that movies are not material. But that does not mean that I think that the Peano axioms can be said to exist absent a material representation, just as I wouldn't think that movies can be said to exist absent a material representation.
> An expression of the form "movies are not material" only says something about which aspects are relevant to the abstraction, not about the underlying reality of instances of movies.
Would the equivalent statement for axioms therefore say "An expression of the form "axioms are not material" only says something about which aspects are relevant to the abstraction, not about the underlying reality of instances of axioms"?
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> Would you also say that electrons are part of non-physical reality, for example? Mind you, we have never observed electrons themselves!
Depends on how you are defining "observe". Regarding electrons, the effects they produce indicates interactions that are physical in nature.
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>> Implicit in my reason is the claim that when one acts according to God's will they will attain maximal joy/happiness.
> Well, sure, but then that's still mostly just the same claim using different words, not a reason to be convinced it's actually true?
You never asked for reasons to be convinced it's true. You asked for reasons to care.
> And the global maximum of eating pleasure is achieved through eating according to Jane's will for your entire life, so don't let dips in local pleasure deter you from abiding by Jane's will.
> Are you convinced yet that eating the way Jane wants you to is the way to go? If not, why not?
If you cared to attain maximum eating pleasure and you believed of Jane that the maximum eating pleasure could be achieved through eating according to Jane's will your entire life, then Jane's will would be the way to go.
To parallel:
If you cared to attain maximum joy/happiness and you believed of God that the maximum joy/happiness could be achieved through acting according to God's will your entire life, the God's will would be the way to go.