These sensors exist to solve a problem with the MAX design. Changing and moving the engines increased the likelihood of a stall when the engines could push the nose up (as I understand it). Fine.
But here's the kicker: this should be something that pilots should be trained on. They should be aware of how the MAX is different to the previous 737s and know what to do to disable this system if it causes problems.
But that might be the end of a common type rating, which is something the airlines (and apparently Boeing) didn't want.
The whole 737 MAX situation just looks like a giant clusterf--- that was a kneejerk reaction to the unexpected success of the A320neo to which Boeing had no answer and to avoid years-long development delays and losing more customers to Airbus, it really looks like they made shortcuts. And that's so damaging to their brand it really defies belief.
These sensors exist to solve a problem with the MAX design. Changing and moving the engines increased the likelihood of a stall when the engines could push the nose up (as I understand it). Fine.
But here's the kicker: this should be something that pilots should be trained on. They should be aware of how the MAX is different to the previous 737s and know what to do to disable this system if it causes problems.
But that might be the end of a common type rating, which is something the airlines (and apparently Boeing) didn't want.
The whole 737 MAX situation just looks like a giant clusterf--- that was a kneejerk reaction to the unexpected success of the A320neo to which Boeing had no answer and to avoid years-long development delays and losing more customers to Airbus, it really looks like they made shortcuts. And that's so damaging to their brand it really defies belief.