So, admittedly I'm still wrapping my brain around the nitty-gritty of Spectre, but what's the solution to this then? It can't actually be that we'll all just accept that sandboxing only works if you spin up a separate process for every single container.
I remember when these attacks first came out that a few people were saying, "speculative processing was a mistake, we should just eat the performance costs and get rid of it." I vaguely remember that position getting a lot of criticism.
Is that where we are though? Are the performance costs of abandoning speculative processing greater than the performance costs of relying on spinning up a new process every time you want sandboxing to work? Or is there a middle ground that I don't understand? Obviously there's a lot of old hardware that's never going to be replaced, but let's say I sit down today to build a new processor for a new computer. Do I just accept that it will be vulnerable and move forward anyway?
My naive reading of this is that Google is saying we need to rethink processors themselves if we want to fix this (and we really do want to fix it). Am I reading it correctly?
I remember when these attacks first came out that a few people were saying, "speculative processing was a mistake, we should just eat the performance costs and get rid of it." I vaguely remember that position getting a lot of criticism.
Is that where we are though? Are the performance costs of abandoning speculative processing greater than the performance costs of relying on spinning up a new process every time you want sandboxing to work? Or is there a middle ground that I don't understand? Obviously there's a lot of old hardware that's never going to be replaced, but let's say I sit down today to build a new processor for a new computer. Do I just accept that it will be vulnerable and move forward anyway?
My naive reading of this is that Google is saying we need to rethink processors themselves if we want to fix this (and we really do want to fix it). Am I reading it correctly?